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ASSESSING THE BUDDHIST INFLUENCES
ON THEIR CONCEPTIONS OF ETHICS
Abstract:Inthefirstpartofthisessay,theauthordiscussescertainaspectsof
the Hindu and Buddhist philosophical and religious conceptions that could have
made some impact on the European ethics before Schopenhauer. In the second part,
he deals with various channels of possible Buddhist influence on Schopenhauer’s
ethicalthought.Finally,indiscussingBuddhist-Wittgensteinrelationship,oneiscon-
frontedwithconvergent,yetindependent,responsestosimilarsetsofproblems.Inde-
pendently, and less systematicallythan Buddhist philosophicalschools, Wittgenstein
indicates the way of liberation that cures from the “metaphysical pain” emerging
from inappropriate use of language. His own project, however, was not metaphysi-
cal, but meta-linguistic in a very specific sense. The philosophical “cure” from the
language disease leads ultimately to the “purification” and “decontamination” of
thought:inturn,themindrestsinpeaceandsilencebeforethesenseless,paradoxical
questions of the moral, esthetical, religious or metaphysical character.
Key words: Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein, ethics, Buddhism.
1. Buddhism and European Ethics before Schopenhauer
ThefirstgenuinespiritualencounterofIndiaandEuropedates
back from the Classical Antiquity. It was not made possible by any
“esoteric sponsor” but, typically, by conquest, diplomacy and trade.
The peaceful Buddhist missions of King Ashoka reached the Medi-
terranean in the mid-third century BCE, in order to preach about
ahimsâ (nonviolence) and spread the good news about the universal
victory of dharma. However, despite the fact that a Greek-Aramaic
inscription, discovered near Kandahar in southern Afghanistan, con-
firmstheexistenceofthosebenevolentethical-politicalmissions,the
text itself does not supply us with any information concerning their
possible political success. Indeed, a very few literary traces, pre-
served usually as fragments, shed some more light on the historical
East-West meeting which took place in the Hellenistic age.
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asthenes’
1 work Indikâ (undoubtedly, the most important classical
sourceonIndian religions andcaste-systems),orappraise Clement’s
and Porphyry’s early knowledge about Brahmins and Sarmans. We
also learn that Christians from the second century had some knowl-
edge of the Buddhist ‘virgin Maya’, and thus perhaps about one of
the versions of Buddha’s birth narrative.
2 On the other hand, one
does not possess any firmer evidence for an intriguing possibility
that Ashvaghosha’s version of Buddha’s biography (composed in
the first century CE!) influenced the corresponding narratives of Je-
sus’conception and birth known from Matthew and Luke.
3
Allinall,ourscantyknowledgeregardinganypossibleHelle-
nistic dialogue between the Greco-Roman/Christian and Indian reli-
gious-philosophical traditions should almost solely be confined to
Alexander’s conquest. According to valuable doxographic accounts
of Apollodorus and Diogenes Laërtius, three prominent Greek phi-
losophers found themselves in Alexander’s suite: Onesicritus, the
disciple of the Cynic Diogenes; Democritus’disciple Anaxarchus of
Abdera; and Pyrrho of Elis, one of the forefathers of Skepticism.
4 In
all likelihood, some of those philosophers were able to incorporate
some concepts from the Indian spiritual heritage into their own
philosophical teachings. We may only assume that atomism of In-
dian philosophical school vaiœesika influenced, to a certain extent,
the analogous interpretations of Democritus’ followers. Diogenes
LaërtiusevenrefersthatDemocritushimself“wasapupil ofsomeof
the Magi and Chaldaeans whom Xerxes had left with his father as
teachers… Some also say that he made acquaintance with the
Gymnosophists in India and that he went to Ethiopia”.
5
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1 Megasthenes served, from 302-291 BCE, as an envoy of the Syrian ruler.
2 See M. Vukomanoviæ, Rani hrišæanski mitovi, Belgrade: Èigoja štampa,
1997, p. 59.
3 Compare, for example, similar themes about Savior’s immaculate concep-
tion, royal origin or the parallel figures of the wise Asita and righteous Simon. This
comparative religious issue was more thoroughly discussed in my paper “Mit o Spa-
sitelju”, Vidici, no. 1-2 (1987), Belgrade, pp. 44-59.
4 Cf. D. Laërtius, The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers (tr. Youn-
ge), London: George Bell & Sons, 1891; book 6 (p.249); book 9 (pp.400-402).
5 Ibid., pp. 390-391.Concerning any possible Buddhist influence on ethics and
epistemology of some Greek-Hellenistic philosophical schools, we
may contend that Pyrrho’s method of suspending judgment (Gr.
epoché) exhibits an amazing congruity with the original Buddhist
meditation system (dhyâna). In European philosophy a similar
method was elaborated, albeit in a much more profound theoretical
manner,inHusserl’sphenomenology.AsfarasIknow,Husserlhim-
self never referred to this interesting Buddhist parallel.
In the light of Pyrrhonism, a direct ethical consequence of
epochéisthetranquilityofmindseenasachiefgood.
6Generalindif-
ference and absence of all emotions leads a Skeptic to believe that
nothing is“honorable ordisgraceful, orjustorunjust”.
7Bysuspend-
ing judgment (which results from a more elementary suspension of
will), one should be able, according to this classical Skeptic teach-
ing, to avoid all things that depend on themselves. The ethical stand-
point that everything is relative toward everything else should,
therefore, aid us in avoiding all the apodictic assertions, be they pos-
itive or negative: “We suspend our judgment on the ground of their
being uncertain; and we know nothing but passions…”
8
All this may certainly be brought into a closer connection
with some major aporetic statements of Hinayana Buddhism. In
Pâsâdika-sutta (Digha III, 136) we encounter one of the oldest for-
mulations of the Buddhist epoché
9:
“TherearesomeasceticsandBrahminswhoholdthedoctrine
and view: (1)that the selfand world areeternal; this istrue and other
view is vain…(2) the self and the world are not eternal…(3) they are
both eternal and not eternal…(4) they are neither eternal nor not
eternal…(Altogether, eight alternatives are stated about the self and
theworld–M.V.).Nowinrejectingandpassingbeyondtheseprinci-
ples ofspeculations relating to things in the past and things in the fu-
ture the four Stations of Mindfulness have been thus taught by me
and set forth. What are the four? Herein a monk abides contemplat-
ing his body, zealous, self possessed, and mindful, dispelling his
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6 Ibid., p. 420.
7 Ibid., p. 402.
8 Ibid., p. 418.
9 The corresponding Buddhist idea may probably be expressed by the notion
citta-viveka (“reduction of consciousness”).longing and dejection towards the world…his feelings…his
mind…his thoughts. In rejecting and passing beyond the principles
of speculations…the four Stations of Mindfulness have been thus
taught by me and set forth”.
10
The principle of moral constraint and indifference (adia-
phora),aswellasaninclination towards the ultimateapatheia (free-
dom from emotions), were not, however, the basic features of Pyr-
rhonism only. They became the common heritage of the most
important ethical systems of Late Antiquity. I believe that some of
those post-classical schools, such as Cynicism or Pyrrhonism, owed
much more to various Oriental influences (including Early Bud-
dhism) than it is usually admitted in some standard histories of Gre-
ek philosophy. Some of those syncretistic trends reappeared within
the soteriological conceptions of Stoicism and various Hellenistic
“gnosticisms”. The Stoic reliance upon the Cynic ethics (which it-
self markedly resembles some forms of Indian asceticism) had been
widely acknowledged in Laërtius time.
11 It is also believed that
Bardesanes of Edessa, as well as some other Gnostic teachers (e.g.
Mani, Basilides, Carpocrates), came into early contacts with Bud-
dhism during their stay in India.
12
Arthur Schopenhauer, whose own Buddhist inclinations will
be discussed later on, maintained, for example, that a systematic
study of the Stoics would “convince everyone that the end of their
ethics, like that of the ethics of Cynicism from which they sprang, is
really nothing else than a life as free as possible frompain and there-
fore as happy as possible…yet it cannot be denied that the later Sto-
ics, especially Arian, sometimes lose sight of this end, and show a
really ascetic tendency which is to be attributed to the Christian and
Oriental spirit in general which was then (i.e. in Late Antiquity - M.
V.) already spreading” (emphases mine).
13
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10 EarlyBuddhistScriptures(tr.E.J.Thomas),London:KeganPaul,1935,pp.
198-199.
11 D. Laërtius, Ibid. p. 258.
12 See E. Conze, “Buddhism and Gnosis”, Further Buddhist Studies, Oxford,
1975, pp. 15-32 or J. Kennedy, “Buddhist Gnosticism, the System of Basilides”,
JRAS, 1902, pp. 377-415.
13 A.Schopenhauer,TheWorldasWillandIdea(WWI),vol.II,London:Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul, 1957, p. 357.Ancient Stoic-Skeptic tradition made a significant impact on
the most prominent ethical theory of modern Europe – i.e. on Im-
manuel Kant’s moral philosophy. The Kantian Hellenistic ideal,
originating, in my view, from the more profound and more system-
atic ethical teachings of the Buddhist India, has partially becomeap-
parent through Scheler’s criticism of this famous philosopher.
Emphasizing the difference between the Kantian and Christian eth-
ics, Max Scheler associates Kant’s moral teaching with the Stoic
doctrine: “As Kant and Stoics believed, there is only a connection
between the ought and the ‘worthiness’of a good man to be, for ex-
ample, happy”.
14
Discussing further the problemof eudemonism,as well as the
connections between the “feeling state” and moral value, Scheler
compares Stoic ethics with the Buddhist theory of life. Both of these
doctrines are then opposed to the Christian theory, because Stoics
and ancient Skeptics “considered apathy, i.e. the deadening of sensi-
ble feelings, as something good”.
15
It is very important, I think, both in terms of Scheler’s scru-
tiny and for a broader understanding of the apatheia concept in the
discussedethicalsystems,torefertoKant’sownapologyofthatfun-
damental pre-Christian virtue. Such an apology is to be found in his
introduction to the Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, where it runs
as follows:
“The word ‘apathy’ has come into bad repute, just as if it
meantlackoffeelingandthereforesubjectiveindifferenceregarding
the objects of choice; it is taken for a weakness. This misinterpreta-
tion can be avoided by giving the name ‘moral apathy’ (emph.
added) to that lack of emotion which is to be distinguished from in-
difference. In moral apathy the feelings arising from sensible im-
pressionslosetheirinfluenceonmoralfeeling…Thetruestrengthof
virtue is the mind at rest (emph. added) with a deliberate and firm
resolution to bring its law (emph. added) into practice. That is the
state of health in the moral life”.
16
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14 M.Scheler,FormalisminEthics,Evanston:NorthwesternUniversityPress,
1973, p. 329.
15 Ibid., p. 346.
16 I. Kant, The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue (tr. J. Ellington), The
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1964, p. 68.If we understand the word ‘law’from the passage above in the
Buddhist sense of dharma, the explanation provided by Kant might
even appear as a quotation from some Abhidharma text! More than
apparentare,ofcourse,thecorrespondingStoicandSkepticparallels.
Now that we have established certain historical, as well as
conceptual points of comparison between the Buddhist ethics and a
very similar line in the development of the European moral philoso-
phy, we are able to highlight some other interesting parallels be-
tween the two traditions. We have seen thus far that Kant’s ‘ethos of
understanding’andtheHellenisticidealofasageweredeeplyrooted
in a fundamentally rational moral principle. The same type of ratio-
nality gave rise to fewcorresponding ethical conceptions that can be
encountered not only in Kant’s Critique of the Practical Reason, but
also in some of the greatest works of Hindu religious-philosophical
literature.WhatIhaveinmindhereistheKantianconceptoftheeth-
ics of duty, as well as his idea of the discipline of the practical rea-
son. Let me now briefly consider some typical formulations of both
these notions. In the first chapter of his Fundamental Principles of
the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant postulates that “an action done
from duty derives its moral worth, not from the purpose which is to
be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined and
therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the ac-
tion, but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has
taken place, without regard to any object of desire”.
17
On the other hand, the most popular ethics of duty encoun-
teredinHinduphilosophy culminatesinthefollowing sayingsofthe
Bhagavad-gita: “He whose undertakings are all free from desires
and self-will, and whose works are consumed in the fire of knowl-
edge – he, by the wise, is called sage. Giving up attachment to the
fruit of action, ever content, and dependent on none… Renunciation
ofthefruitofactionisbetterthanmeditation;peaceimmediatelyfol-
lows such renunciation”.
18
It is certainly in complete accordance with various Hindu
teachings (and especially in the spirit of yoga and Buddhist dhyana)
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17 I. Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics ( t r .T .K .A b -
bott), London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1895, pp. 18-19.
18 The Bhagavad-gita (tr. Swami Nikhilananda), New York: Ramakrishna Vi-
vekananda Center, 1944, pp. 133-134 and 278.to associate this crucial deontological principle with an appropriate
systemor discipline of “mindcultivation”. In the light of Kant’s the-
oretical propositions, it has sometimes been forgotten that this
thinker very seriously considered the idea of practical exercise
through which “the dignity of the pure law” would be upheld.
19 In
Kant’s second Critique the same proposal has been developed in the
following manner:
“Now there is no doubt that this exercise and the conscious-
ness of cultivation of our reason (emph. added) which judges con-
cerning the practical must gradually produce a certain interest even
in its own law and thus in morally good actions”.
20
As soon as this “matching” brings some effect, “the pure
moral motive must be brought to mind This is not only because it is
the sole ground of character…but also because, in teaching a man to
feel his worth, it gives his mind a power unexpected even by himself,
to pull himself loose from all sensuous attachments…(emph.
added)”.
21
With the help of these rather detailed quotations from Kant’s
opus, I have attempted to show how this entire idea about the culti-
vation of reason corresponds, to a certain extent, to some aspects of
Hindu yoga. It seems that Immanuel Kant – the creator of the most
influential ethical system in modern Western philosophy – clearly
aligned himself with the Hellenistic model of the ethos of under-
standing, giving it, at the same time, a certain priority to the Pla-
tonic-Christian exaltation of the archetypal ideas pertaining to the
sphere of the divine transcendence. With his Critique of Pure Rea-
son Kant, furthermore, prepared the basis for a sort of atheistic reli-
giosity, which directly led to Schopenhauer’s and Nietzsche’s
penetrating criticisms
22 of Judeo-Christian tradition.
Through their genuine insight into the rational “advantage”
of the Buddhist discipline of practical reason over the Christian
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19 SeeTheMetaphysicalPrinciplesofVirtue,pp.56-57,aswellastheCritique
of Practical Reason (tr. L.W. Beck), Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1956, p. 156.
20 Critique of Practical Reason, p. 164.
21 Ibid., p. 156.
22 In the context of our comparativeanalysis, it is interestingthat in both cases
suchacritiquecouldnotbefullyaccomplishedwithoutthestrongrelianceuponHin-
du and Buddhist religious and philosophical heritage.logique de coeur, both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer emphasized not
only the philosophical, but also physiological and hygienic aspects
of early Buddhism. Faitful to Shakyamuni’s teachings, they both
agreed that some ‘hygienic measures’were needed for victory over
resentment. To liberate the soul from various passions is, therefore
“the first step towards recovery”. Nietzsche’s own axiological posi-
tion “beyond good and evil” is, by the same token, adopted from
Buddhist philosophy. On the other hand, Arthur Schopenhauer, the
first renowned comparativist philosopher in the history of modern
East-West encounters, profoundly recognizes the importance of the
Hellenistic schools for the convergent development of the classical
ethical concepts such as ataraxia, apatheia or ‘spiritual hygiene’.
23
Not until Schopenhauer wrote his World as Will and Idea was
the history of Western philosophy able to fully acknowledge its debt
to the Oriental moral wisdom that quietly, and almost mysteriously,
prompted some of the most significant trends in the continental Eu-
ropean ethics.
2. Consolatio philosophiae: Arthur Schopenhauer and the Rise
of the “European Buddhism”
2.1. The Sources
In his preface to the first edition of his major work The World
asWillandIdea(1818)ArthurSchopenhauer presented hisprospec-
tive readers with three, apparently pretentious requirements:
1) The book should be read twice.
2) The introduction to this book, written five years before
this work, should be read before the book itself.
3) Athorough acquaintance with Kant’s principal writings is
also expected.
Thethirdrequirementis,atthesametime,themainpresuppo-
sition for an appropriate understanding of Schopenhauer’s work.
“But if, besides this, the reader has lingered in the school of the di-
vine Plato”, as Schopenhauer would have it, “he will be so much the
better prepared to hear me, and susceptible to what I say. And if,
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23 See, for example, WWI, vol. II, ch. XVI.indeed, in addition to this he is a partaker of the benefit conferred by
theVedas,theaccesstowhich,openedtousthroughtheUpanishads,
is in my eyes the greatest advantage which this still young century
enjoysoverprevious ones,because Ibelieve thattheinfluence ofthe
Sanskrit literature will penetrate not less deeply than did the revival
of Greek literature in the fifteenth century: if, I say, the reader has
also already received and assimilated the sacred, primitive Indian
wisdom,then is he the best of all prepared to hear what Ihave to say
to him (emph. added)”.
24
Now, it would be very interesting to examine how Scho-
penhauer, at the very outset of the 19
th century, could have expected
fromhisreadersanyknowledge ofastillesotericandgenerallyinac-
cessible Indian wisdom. How is it possible, one may ask, that the
Germanphilosophersopropheticallyanticipated apenetratinginflu-
ence of the Sanskrit literature on the forthcoming generations of
scholars?
In order to fully respond to those questions, one is unexpect-
edly drawn back into history ofthe famousTaj Mahal Mausoleum in
Agra, India. This monument was, namely, built in accordance with
the directions of the Persian Shah Jahan. When the emperor’s son,
Prince Dara Shukoh, sojourned in Kashmir, he had accidentally
heard about the Upanishads and enthusiastically ordered their trans-
lations into Persian. The translation of 50 Upanishads was com-
pleted in 1657, and one century later, the French scholar Anquetil
DuperronwasalreadyabletoreadthemduringhisownstayinIndia.
Moreover, Duperron began to prepare the first and (no matter how
inaccurate) most famous European translation of those sacred texts.
The first translations from Persian into Latin appeared in the Asiatic
Researches Annuals in 1787, whereasthe completeedition waspub-
lished inParisin1802. Andthose werethepaths bywhich these pre-
cious works of the Hindu religious literature reached Schopenhauer,
becoming, as he used to say, the solace of his life and the solace of
his death.
25
In contrast to Schlegel or Humboldt, Schopenhauer himself
never learned Sanskrit. He became acquainted with the Upanishads,
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24 WWI, pp. xii-xiii.
25 Parerga and Paralipomena (tr. E. F. J. Payne), Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1974 (vol. II, § 185). Further – PP.as well as with many other works of Oriental literature, solely thro-
ughtheirLatin,EnglishorFrenchtranslations. Moreover,amonghis
various notes and writings we encounter very precise references to
chief sources ofhisratherimpressiveknowledge about Brahmanism
and Buddhism. We learn, for example, that Schopenhauer was well
acquainted with the publications of the Asiatic Society (Asiatic Re-
searches), and particularly with the writings of its founder – SirWil-
liam Jones.
26
It is usually maintained that Schopenhauer’s admiration for
India had been awakened by the pioneering work of Herder’s con-
temporaryF.Majer.
27Itseems,however,that the “pessimistphiloso-
pher” gained his first more systematic knowledge on Buddhism in
theperiodbetweenthetwoeditionsofTheWorldasWillandIdea.In
any event, his Parerga and Paralipomena, a philosophical essay
pertaining to Schopenhauer’s later phase, contains muchmorerefer-
ences to various studies on Buddhism.
28 His admiration for this reli-
gion provided a powerful impetus, so that he occasionally gave it an
absolute priority to other traditions.
29
Even a less attentive reader of Schopenhauer’s major writings
can easily observe that their author very often jointly mentions or as-
sesses Brahmanism and Buddhism, especially in an attempt to op-
pose them to some other religious or philosophical doctrines.
30 As a
rule, such a confrontation takes place within the broader discussions
on Judaism and Christianity, or, more specifically, their theism.
SometimesSchopenhauerconsidersone’sknowledgeoftheseIndian
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26 Cf. WWIII, note1 on p. 501. BesidesJonesand Duperron, Schopenhauerin
thesameplacementionsPolier’sworkonHindumythology,aswellassomecontem-
porary translationsof various Orientalists.From the historicalpoint of view it would
be worthwhileto noticeSchopenhauer’s satisfactionwith an obviousfactthat“in the
last forty years (i.e. since the first edition of the WWI – M. V.) Indian literature has
grown so much in Europe, that the completionof the mentioned bibliographicalnote
would (now) occupy several pages”.
27 See R. F. Merkel, “Schopenhauers Indien-Lehrer”, Jahrbuch der Schopen-
hauer-Gesellschaft 32 (1945/48), pp. 158-181.
28 SuchasI.J.Schmidt’sGeschichtederOstmongolen(vol.II,p.203);Spence
Hardy’s Manual of Buddhism (II, 276); E. Burnhof’s Introduction a l’histoire du
Bouddhism (II, 382); Upham’s “Doctrine of Buddhism” (III, 282), etc.
29 See WWI II, p. 371.
30 See, for example, PP II, pages 37, 238, 302, 362, 364, 368, 370-371, 376,
378, 381, etc.religions as a prerequisite for any thorough understanding of Chris-
tianity. His praise for Hinduism and Buddhism goes, in fact, far be-
yond a reasonable extent, so that he even tries to convince the reader
that the New Testament “must somehow be of Indian origin”!
31
Itseemstome,however,thatsuchaunanimousappreciationof
Oriental wisdom conceals an excessive level of anti-Judaism that
strikes us almost immediately from the pages of his Parerga and
Paralipomena (especially in the paragraphs on ethics and religion). It
is very difficult to say whether such an antipathy was a result of his
purely philosophical rejections of Judaic ‘theism’ and ‘rationalism’,
or perhaps a reflection of some more general ideological trends of
GermanRomanticism.Atanyrate,Schopenhauerhopes,forexample,
that“onedayevenEuropewillbepurifiedofallJewishmythology”,
32
or that Judaic “crude dogma was sublimated by the Christian”, so it
must be admitted that Christianity is “far superior” to Judaism.
33
After these preliminary remarks on the sources of Schopen-
hauer’s knowledge about Indian religions, let me, at least briefly, re-
flect upon some issues of Schopenhauer’s philosophy.
2.2. Mâyâ, Karman, Nirvâna: Three Pillars of Schopenhauer’s
Atheism
The point of departure of Schopenhauer’s philosophy has
been partly formulatedin the verytitle ofhis opus magnum byan as-
sertion that the World isMyIdea(orRepresentation).
34According to
the German philosopher, this is an aprioristic statement “which
holdsgoodforeverythingthatlivesandknows”.Therealfoundation
of Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is to be encountered in a fundamen-
tal belief that the whole world is only an object in relation to the cor-
responding subject, “perception of a perceiver, in a word, idea”.
35
Schopenhauer believed that this metaphysical ‘truth’ had already
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31 See PP II, p. 380.
32 PP II, p. 226.
33 PP II, p. 363.
34 I think that the word re-presentation is not the completely accurate transla-
tion of the German Vorstellung, which actually covers the English term idea, as well
as presentation (pre- is, namely, the true equivalent of the German vor-, while the
prefix re- implies the reversibility of a certain process).
35 WWI I, p. 3.been expressed in Berkeley’s idealism, as well as in the Vedantic
school of Indian philosophy.
Theessenceofthisteachingis,therefore,notnew.Inthesame
line with Heraclitus, Plato, Spinoza and Kant, Schopenhauer puts
“theancient Indian wisdom”,i.e. the doctrine ofmâyâ understood as
a “veil of deception, which blinds the eyes of mortals, and makes
them behold a world of which they cannot say either that it is or that
itisnot:foritislikeadream(emph.added); itislikethesunshine on
the sand which the traveler takes from afar for water or the stray
piece of rope he mistakes for a snake”.
36
From such a philosophical viewpoint one may, therefore,
quite naturally pose the question about the actuality of an outer
world, i.e. about the possibility of distinction between dreamand re-
ality. In order to remain faithful to his initial metaphysical concep-
tion, Schopenhauer allows that it is impossible to make any absolute
distinction between dreams and reality, phantasms and real objects:
“Life and dreams are leaves of the same book”.
37
Schopenhauer’s “dream theory” is, again, nothing new either
in European or Eastern philosophy. In almost identical form we en-
counter it both in Taoism and in Heraclitus’fragments.
38 Neverthe-
less, Schopenhauer mainly relies on the Vedanta doctrine of mâyâ:
the world itself is experienced as a meredreamor an illusion. On the
other hand, Schopenhauer wrongly assumes that the roots of this In-
diandoctrine mayberecognized backintheVedictimes.Forevenin
the most ancient Upanishads (e.g. Brihadâranyaka) the concept of
mâyâ had not been used in the same sense in which Schopenhauer
began to employ it. In ancient brahmanic literature, including the
Vedas and older Upanishads, mâyâ wasstill understood as a creative
divinepowerbywhichthisworldcameintobeing.Notuntilthelater
Upanishads did mâyâ obtain another meaning: that of the world-de-
lusion, dreamand phantasm. This case mayserve as a good example
of how Schopenhauer himself acquired his knowledge about Indian
religious-philosophical traditions. In early 19
th century it was hardly
possible forsuchaninspiredthinker(withoutanappropriate linguis-
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36 Ibid., p. 9.
37 Ibid., p. 22.
38 E.g.theanecdoteaboutChuang-tzuandabutterfly,orHeraclitus’fragments
21, 88, 89.tic “equipment”) to go far beyond the unsystematic information ob-
tained from various missionary publications.
Thesecond basic axiomofSchopenhauer’ssystemissumma-
rized in his statement that the “World is the Objectivation of Will”.
Led by Kant’s distinction between the ‘phenomenon’ and the
‘thing-in-itself’, Schopenhauer opposed the world presentation to
will,itsrealbasis and presupposition. Will is,therefore, the essential
characteristic ofahumanbeing asa‘subject’,andnatural initiator of
human action.
39 Furthermore, will is the eternal and indestructible
essenceofeverylivingorganism;itisabsolutelyconfrontedwiththe
impermanence of the world, time/space and appearance. Will
objectifies itself within the realm of this transient world. Its object-
ivation is the energy of action or creation by which the entire phe-
nomenalworldhascomeintobeing.LiketheVedicIshvara,ahuman
being also partakes in creating and shaping this world. Their differ-
ent degrees of perfection are the only points of distinction in such
formations. According to Schopenhauer, it is important to under-
stand that will is the universal principle of volition, both in the or-
ganic and inorganic realms of existence. Hence this impulse is blind
and unconscious, emerging from the same primary instinct – will to
life. The whole existence oscillates between the two poles – life and
death. Only will, taken as a thing-in-itself, never dies. By the same
token, fear from death is senseless, because it stems from the fear of
pain that may be experienced during the dying process.
It is apparent, I think, that the doctrine of will as an energy of
action roughly corresponds to the ancient Indian karma-samsara
theories. BothVedantic andBuddhist interpretations ofthisteaching
emphasize the similar vitalism and dynamics encountered in Schop-
enhauer’s “voluntaristic” ethics. The action (karman) that stems
fromthewilling istheprincipal causeofbecominganddisappearing
(i.e. continuous rebirth) of living organisms. The world is the result
of that effort, of that constant drive towards re-shaping the reality.
And this willing may be endless, representing the ultimate cause of
all rebirth. Very often, Schopenhauer’s crucial arguments are bor-
rowed fromIndian soteriological conceptions. On the other hand, he
isabletoaccommodatethose Oriental teachings tohisownconcepts
and ideas. A relation of convergence may certainly be established
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39 Cf., for example, his explanation on the page 153 (Ibid.).betweenhisandIndianphilosophies. Auniqueblending ofthesetwo
perspectives – sometimes labeled as “European Buddhism”
40 –
emerged from this.
However simplified it may seem, Schopenhauer’s version of
Buddhism contributes, indeed, to the first comparative encounter or,
rather, creative dialogue between the East and the West in the history
of European metaphysics and ethics. With this in mind, let me con-
sider some of the more explicit theoretical contributions of the Bud-
dhist“partner”inthisdialogue.WehavealreadymentionedSchopen-
hauer’s inquiry into the chainlike structure of the principle of volition
and karmic causality. This whole idea is very precisely formulated in
thefirstvolumeofhisWorldasWillandIdea,withintheunusualcon-
text of discussion about the Object of Art. There it runs as follows:
“And willing arises fromwant, therefore fromdeficiency, and
therefore from suffering. The satisfaction of a wish ends it; yet for
one wish that is satisfied there remain at least ten which are denied.
Further, the desire lasts long, the demands are infinite; the satisfac-
tion is short and scantily measured out. But even the final satisfac-
tion is itself only apparent; every satisfied wish at once makes room
for a new one; both are illusions; the one is known to be so, the other
not yet. No attained object of desire can give lasting satisfaction, but
merely a fleeting gratification; it is like the alms thrown to the beg-
gar, that keeps himalive to-day that his miserymaybe prolonged till
the morrow (emph. added)”.
41
Affliction is, therefore, the prevalent content of human life.
The satisfaction of the desire is only ostensible, so that the new
wants and needs lead to repeated dissatisfactions, etc. Happiness is
always an unattainable human goal if it arises from an effort of will
to accomplish any temporary purpose. After a certain period of life,
one becomes aware of the painful fact that the ultimate goal may
never be attained. The subject of willing behaves like Sisyphus,
IxionorTantalus.
42Sufferingandpainbecometheonlycertainreali-
ties, while death is the final result of the will to life.
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40 TheexpressionitselfisborrowedfromF.Nietzsche.Heassociatedit,howe-
ver, with the ‘nihilistic catastrophe’ which, in his view, is an essentially European
phenomenon.IncontrasttoNietzsche,Iemploy“EuropeanBuddhism”inamorepo-
sitive, “dialogical” sense.
41 WWI I, p. 253.
42 Ibid., p. 254.Schopenhauer,therefore,attemptsto find thesolution forend-
less suffering and pain in quite another direction. His examination is
based on the insight that any affirmation of life, i.e. the positive real-
ization of will, finally brings evil into play. If this positive act of will
leadstotheultimatepain,suffering,diseaseordeath,thentheauthen-
tic response to life should be negative in its character. The natural re-
sult of this existential experience of affliction and pain is the disgust
orabhorrenceexpressed toward world and life, an awarenessoftheir
worthlessness. The negative attitude towards life results in the claim
for denial or cessation of will. The chain of suffering and pain must,
therefore, be ceased in an opposite direction.
43
This, however, does not mean that Schopenhauer recom-
mends suicide as final solution. On the contrary. Suicide is, in fact,
“a phenomenon of strong assertion of will”.
44 It is the expression of
humanweakness,hisinabilitytoovercomethelifepain.Oneshould,
however, confront the suffering in an utterly different manner. Via
negativa recommended by Schopenhauer may only be realized by
askesis. Asceticism is understood as a gradual negation of will, a
slow,butthorougheliminationofthecausesofsuffering.Theascetic
effort is, at the same time, the last act of will by which it definitely
denies itself, bringing its own essence on the level of absurdness.
According toSchopenhauer,thisistheonlyappropriate wayleading
to absolute liberation. Aswehave already pointed out, such a libera-
tion is to be found in an absolute and eternal peace, in ‘cooling
down’one’s life: “No will: no idea, no world. Before us there is cer-
tainly only nothingness”.
45
Although Schopenhauer himself never explicitly said that, it
is hard to avoid the impression that this entire theoretical scheme –
the core of his ethical conception – represents an original adaptation
of the traditional Buddhist doctrine.
46 The negation of suffering and
pain originating in the will to life is interpreted in the classical Bud-
dhist ethics of the Hinayana school as the neutralization of the
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43 This argumentation is more thoroughly elaborated in the fourth book of
WWI, vol. I.
44 WWI I, p. 514.
45 Ibid., p. 531.
46 It is certainly no accident that the last footnote, encountered at the very end
of his exposition, refers to the Buddhist Prajna-Paramita teaching, as well as to J. J.
Schmidt’s work “Über das Mahajana und Pratschna-Paramita”.karmic causality that ultimately leads to Nirvana, the final “extinc-
tion of the fire of life”.
ThegenuineBuddhistteaching,formulatedinthechain-of-ca-
usation doctrine (paticca-samuppanna), might have been familiar to
Schopenhauer through some English translations and interpretations
oftheBuddhistcanonicalwritings.
47TheGermanphilosopher’sethi-
calconception,inwhichtheexpositionofthischain-of-causationoc-
cupies very dominant position, reminds very much of the Buddhist
analysisofthetwelve‘links’(nidâna)scheme.Thisschemeexempli-
fiesthe chain ofcausation asconstantlyrenewing in the Samsara-cir-
cle of life and death. According to this Buddhist conception, which
basicallyreliesonthetraditionalIndiandoctrineofkarmaanditsori-
gin, all the dispositions finally originate in ignorance. The ignorance
(avidyâ) causes the aggregates (samkhâra), whereas the aggregates
generate consciousness (vidynâna), name-and-form (nama-rupa)
and feeling (vedanâ). From feeling, again, the ‘thirst of life’(tanhâ)
and the desire to be (upadana) eventually arise. Being (bhavo), re-
birth (dyâti) ,o l da g ea n dd e a t h( dyarâ-maranam) are ultimately
caused by that desire. The chain of causation is not unrepeatable, but
may be applied to all possible incarnations, i.e. to the potential lives
and deaths of any individual.
Schopenhauer thussearched forawayoutoftheSamsara-cir-
cle in an ascetic striving for Nirvana, the final “extinction” of the
“fire of life”. In fact, he only followed the way of Gautama Buddha,
opened up twenty-five centuries ago. In that sense, Schopenhauer’s
“nihilism” represents a kind of modern philosophical interpretation
oftheancient Buddhist doctrine about the‘worthlessness oftheself’
(sunna-vâda).
Consequently, Schopenhauer was one of the rare modern Eu-
ropean thinkers who had accepted Shakyamuni’s ‘four noble truths’
(thetruth about the pain, about the origination ofpain, about the ces-
sation of it and about the path to its cessation). This doctrine found
its appropriate setting in the heart of the lonesome German philoso-
pher who, until the very end of his life, sought for his only consola-
tion in the newly recovered works of Indian religious literature.
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47 SuchasthepopulartextbookMilindapanho(“TheQuestionsofKingMilin-
da”),orthecollectionofsuttasSamyutta-nikaya(cf.II,10inEarlyBuddhistScriptu-
res, pp. 118-121).3. Wittgenstein and Buddhism or How to Shew the Fly the Way
out of the Fly-Bottle
Thus far I have been presenting various channels of possible
Buddhist influence on the European and, in particular, Schopen-
hauer’s ethical thought. It seems quite understandable that the dis-
cussion of the post-classical, Hellenistic, as well as Schopenhauer’s
moralconceptions hasledfromthequestion ofsources(bothhistori-
cal and literary ones) to somemorespecific issues of comparative or
hermeneutical character.
As for Wittgenstein’s philosophy, our approach should be gu-
idedbyanentirelydifferentprocedure.SofarasIwasabletodiscern,
one may not ascribe any direct impact of Buddhist philosophy onto
Wittgenstein’s thought. Indeed, nothing is known of any sources of
such an influence. In contrast to Schopenhauer, who is truly im-
pressedbyalmosteverysuttaorstanzafromtheIndianreligiouswrit-
ings, Wittgenstein does not refer to any work or passage from that
literature. Furthermore, the philosopher from Vienna rarely refers to
other authors at all. And when he does so, it is not unusual that
amongsthisvariousnotes,sketchesand bracketswefind thenameof
Arthur Schopenhauer. We ought to be cautious enough, however, not
to overemphasize an obvious link between the two philosophers. For
it is hard to attest that Schopenhauer – an ingenious philosophical
transmitter of Oriental heritage though he was – played any signifi-
cant mediating role in prompting Wittgenstein’s interest for Bud-
dhism. At this point I agree with Chris Gudmunsen who claims that
even if there were some similarities between Wittgenstein and Bud-
dhism, theyhad not been “passed on via Schopenhauer” who himself
influenced Wittgenstein on different issues.
48 I ti s ,i nf a c t ,m u c h
easiertoassesstheimportanceofSchopenhauer’simpactonthe“eth-
ical” Wittgenstein of the Tractatus,
49 than to determine any corre-
sponding affinities between the Schopenhauer-Buddhist lines of
thought and Wittgenstein’s conception of ethics.
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48 SeeC.Gudmunsen,WittgensteinandBuddhism,NewYork:BarnesandNo-
ble Books, 1977, p. 112.
49 Cf., for example, the studies of R. B. Goodman, “Schopenhauer and Witt-
genstein on Ethics”, Journal of the History of Philosophy vol. 17, no. 4 (1979) and J.
S. Clegg, “Logical Mysticism and the Cultural Setting of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus”,
Schopenhauer Jahrbuch vol. 59 (1978).In my approach to this problem I am, therefore, left with the
third, and probably most productive hypothesis: in discussing Bud-
dhist-Wittgenstein relationship, one is actually confronted with the
convergent, yet independent, responses to similar sets of problems.
Oneshouldbearinmind,however,thatsomestrikingsimilaritiesoc-
curringbetweenWittgenstein’sandBuddhist(especiallyMahayana)
philosophical conceptions maynotsoeasilybeobserved inthemore
specific area of ethics and religion.
50
To bring this out, we first note that Ludwig Wittgenstein (in
contrasttoMooreorRussell)didnotsystematicallywriteonthetop-
icsof“practicalphilosophy”. Evenamonghisvariousposthumously
published manuscripts,
51 ethical and religious problems were dis-
cussed in proportionally lesser extent. Simultaneously, this does not
mean that Wittgenstein neglected, or less respected those practical
matters. On the contrary, as T. Redpath has aptly pointed out, it is
more likely that Wittgenstein expressed a kind of ‘religious attitude’
towards moral and esthetic judgments. In this connection it may be
said that Wittgenstein in his Tractatus and “Lecture on Ethics”
treated ethics as transcendental or even supernatural.
52 Well known
is, of course, Wittgenstein’s “explosive” metaphor that “we cannot
write a scientific book, the subject matter of which could be intrinsi-
cally sublime and above all other subject matters…if a man could
write a book on Ethics, this book would, with an explosion, destroy
all the other books in the world”. In other words, any attemptat putt-
ing ethical (or, for that matter, religious) expressions into the lan-
guage of logical analysis, would inevitably result in nonsense.
On the other hand, in his 1919 letter to Ficker, Wittgenstein
surprisingly uncovers the point of his Tractatus as “an ethical one…
Mybook draws limits to the sphereof the ethical fromthe inside asit
were…Ihavemanaged…toputeverythingintoplacebybeingsilent
about it” (emph. added).
53
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50 In the most detailed analysis written in English of those convergent “move-
mentsofthought”,i.e. inGudmunsen’sbook Wittgensteinand Buddhism (chapteron
Ethics and Religion), we find very little material that would lead us to accept any
overly optimistic resolution to this problem.
51 See Bibliography.
52 Tractatus 6.421.
53 Engelmann, Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein (Letter to Ficker, 1919), Ox-
ford, 1967, pp. 143-144.One could better understand what Wittgenstein really meant
with this seemingly ambiguous pronouncement if one recalls his
pregnant “ladder metaphor” appearing at the very end of his Trac-
tarian enterprise.
54 More precisely, the Tractatus may be understood
as a book on ethics in the sense that it “draws the (inside) limits” to
the sphere of the ethical, by making use of language (propositions)
thatmustbetranscended attheverymomentwhentheyceasetoper-
form their supporting function.
What isimpliedbythis proposal isthat almostentire theoreti-
cal enterprise undertaken in the Tractatus and “ALecture on Ethics”
represents a unique peirastiké,
55 or setting the boundaries of lan-
guage in the similar sense in which Kant “measured the extent” of
thedomainofpureunderstanding inhisfirstCritique.Wittgenstein’s
philosophical task is, in my view, “critical” or “peirastic” in pretty
much the Kantian manner, albeit applied on different sets of prob-
lems. It is, moreover, reductive or “epoché-al” in the vein of the
same tradition leading from Pyrrho, via Stoics and Kant to Husserl
and two modern representatives of “European Buddhism – Scho-
penhauer and Nietzsche. And hereby we arrive at the Buddhist pole
of the discussed relationship. But before I refer to some similarities
withBuddhism,itwouldbeworthwhile,Ithink,toreflectmorecare-
fully on what is actually implied by the above proposal.
In his conclusions to both Tractatus and “A Lecture on Eth-
ics”, the author exhibits a very similar methodical attitude towards
all attempts to exceed the limits of language:
“What we cannot speak about we must consign to silence”.
(Tractatus,7 )
“My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men
who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against
the boundaries of language (emph. mine). This running against the
walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless” (A Lecture on
Ethics, p.13).
Goingbeyondlanguage means,accordingly,togobeyondthe
world, life and self.
56
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54 See Tractatus, 6.54.
55 An Aristotelian term which basically means “defining” or “determining the
limits” (scope) of a subject matter.
56 See Tractatus 5.6; 5.621; 5.63, etc.After his comprehensive comparative inquiries into the worlds
ofvariousmythologiesand religions,theGerman 19
thcenturyphilolo-
gist Max Müller came to a firm conclusion that myth originated in the
self-deception and deficiency, in a sort of weakness or ‘disease’char-
acteristic of language.
57 We could perhaps, by making use of a similar
analogy, declare that Wittgenstein of the Tractatus was fully alive to
the same weakness of language pertaining to any hopeless attempt to
go beyond its “natural” boundaries. Moreover, his own philosophical
enterprise consisted very much of a “therapeutic” effort to “cure” or
“clean” theories from different kinds of “pollution”. Therapeia logou
or “the therapy of language” was, in fact, a unique Wittgensteinian
techniqueof“showingtheflythewayoutofthebottle”.
58Iaminclined
to believe that this same therapeutic method should not be confined to
the Tractarian Wittgenstein only. It finds its adequate expression fur-
ther, in his “second phase” (Philosophical Investigations), where it
was metaphorically described as the aim of his philosophy.
ComparingtheworkoftheViennesephilosopher withNagar-
juna’s Buddhist teaching, Fred Streng appropriately asserts that
Wittgenstein’s method was founded on the assumption that “the
metaphysical systems are mental constructs produced to a large ex-
tent from an extension of functional relationship of words” (emph.
added).
59 When we develop further this interesting Buddhist-Wit-
tgenstein parallel,wefindthattheliberation ofthought, accordingto
both philosophies, consists of freeing oneself fromthe burden of su-
perfluous concepts andproblemsrooted intheillegitimateextension
of verbal boundaries. Philosophy is, therefore, “a battle against the
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language”. In the con-
text of Buddhist religious philosophy, a similar principle carries a
specific weight both in the classical teachings of the Theravada
school,
60 and in the Mahayana philosophy of Nagarjuna or various
Zen teachers.
61 Especially in Zen does the paradoxical nature of
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57 Max Müller, “The Philosophy of Mythology”, appended to his Science of
Religion, London, 1873, pp. 353-355.
58 Philosophical Investigations, 309.
59 See Gudmunsen, Ibid., p. 67.
60 Let us recall the Early Buddhist doctrine of “vain speculations” (Digha III,
136) - note 10 of this essay.
61 OntheparallelswithNagarjuna,seeGudmunsen(ch.5)andF.Streng,Emp-
tiness: A Study in Religious Meaning, Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1967.koans display an anti-metaphysical, practical impact. The way
things really are cannot be described by words.
62 The “real nature of
Buddha” in Zen, as well as the ethical or religious postulates about
the ultimate good, absolute value or existence of God (Wittgenstein)
maynotbeexpressedbystandardverbalmeans;thepotential misuse
of language could not even be avoided by the employment of simi-
les, allegories or metaphors.
63 This is the case with Zen koans, and
the same applies to Wittgenstein’s own aphorisms.
How can all this be related to Wittgenstein’s conception of
ethics? Independently, and less systematically than the Buddhist
philosophical schools, Wittgenstein indicates the way of liberation
that cures from the “metaphysical pain”
64 emerging from inappropri-
ate use of language. He does not recommend either positive or nega-
tive ‘hygienic measures’ prescribed by Stoics, Schopenhauer or
Nietzsche, remaining thus more faithful to Kant’scritical and agnos-
tic heritage. His own project, however, was not metaphysical, but
meta-linguistic in a very specific sense. The philosophical “cure”
from the language disease leads ultimately to the “purification” and
“decontamination” of thought (mind, consciousness): in turn, the
mind rests in peace and silence before the senseless, paradoxical
questions of the moral, esthetical, religious or metaphysical charac-
ter.Ifthereisanyareaofthetranscendent,supernaturalvaluesplaced
beyond our relative conceptions of good and evil, right and wrong,
we should respect it profoundly, silently and, at the same time, not
ridicule it with futile attempts of a fly seduced by an empty bottle.
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62 Gudmunsen, Ibid., p. 80.
63 See “A Lecture on Ethics”, p. 11.
64 Note Wittgenstein’s frequent variations on the pain-theme in Philosophical
Investigations (I 253; 284-296; 310ff; 315ff; 350ff, etc.Bibliography
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Milan Vukomanoviæ
ŠOPENHAUER I VITGENŠTAJN: RAZMATRANJE
BUDISTIÈKIH UTICAJA NA NJIHOVA ETIÈKA UÈENJA
Sa etak
Ovaj esej se sastoji iz tri dela. U prvom delu autor razmatra izvesne aspekte
hinduistièkih i budistièkih filozofskih i religijskih doktrina koje su mogle imati
uticajanaevropskuetikudoŠopenhauera.Naprimer,Pironovmetoduzdr avanjaod
suda ispoljava zapanjujuæu sliènost s izvornim budistièkim metodom meditacije
(dhyâna). U evropskoj filozofiji slièan metod je razvijen u Huserlovoj fenomenolo-
giji, iako na jedan puno slo eniji teorijski naèin. Razmatranje postklasiènih, heleni-
stièkih moralnih doktrina vodi od problema izvora (istorijskih i literarnih) do nekih
specifiènih pitanja komparativne ili hermeneutièke prirode. Pa ipak, u povesti
zapadne filozofije nije se jasno ukazalo na dug budistièkoj etici sve dok Šopenhauer
nije napisao Svet kao volja i predstava. U drugom delu rada autor se stoga bavi
razlièitim tokovima moguæeg budistièkog uticaja na Šopenhauerovu etièku misao.
VrloèestoŠopenhauerovikljuèniargumentisupozajmljeniizindijskihsoterioloških
uèenja. S druge strane, on je u stanju da prilagodi ta orijentalna uèenja svojim vla-
stitim pojmovima i idejama. Izmeðu njegove filozofije i indijskih filozofija moguæe
je uspostaviti odnos konvergentnosti. Iz toga je proizišlo jedinstveno stapanje dveju
perspektiva koje se ponekad oznaèava i kao „evropski budizam“.
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ÆZa razliku od Šopenhauera, Vitgenštajn ne upuæuje ni na kakvo delo, ili
odlomak iz hinduistièke ili budistièke literature. Štaviše, teško je braniti stav da je
Šopenhauer imao ikakvu znaèajniju posrednièku ulogu u buðenju Vitgenštajnovog
interesovanja za budizam. Mnogo je, u stvari, lakše ukazati na va nost Šopenhau-
erovog uticaja na „etièkog“ Vitgenštajna iz Tractatusa, nego utvrditi ikakvu sliènost
izmeðu šopenhauerovsko-budistièke i Vitgenštajnove etièke koncepcije. Raspra-
vljajuæi o odnosu izmeðu Vitgenštajna i budizma, susreæemo se s konvergentnim, ali
nezavisnim odgovorima na sliène vrste problema. Nezavisno, i manje sistematièno
od budistièkih filozofskih škola, Vitgenštajn ukazuje na put osloboðenja što leèi od
„metafizièke boli“ zasnovane na nepravilnoj upotrebi jezika. Meðutim, njegov vla-
stiti projekat nije bio metafizièki, veæ metalingvistièki u jednom vrlo specifiènom
smislu. Filozofsko „izleèenje“ od bolesti jezika vodi, u krajnjoj liniji, do „oèišæenja“
i „dekontaminacije“ misli. Kao rezultat toga, um nalazi spokoj i mir pred besmi-
slenim, paradoksalnim pitanjima moralnog, estetièkog, religijskog ili metafizièkog
karaktera.
Kljuène reèi: Šopenhauer, Vitgenštajn, etika, budizam.
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